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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a tool, called DataProVe, for specifying high-level data protection
policies and system architectures, as well as verifying the conformance between them in a
fully automated way. The syntax of the policies and the architectures is based on semi-formal
languages, and the automated verification engine relies on logic and resolution based proofs.
The functionality and operation of the tool are presented using different examples.
1 Introduction
The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect in May 2018, and hence, design-
ing compliant data protection policies and system architectures seem became even more important
for organizations to avoid penalties. Unfortunately, the regulation given in a textual format is
sometimes ambiguous and can be misinterpreted by the policy and system designers.
In [1], we proposed a semi-formal policy and an architecture language, presented their syntax
and semantics, as well as the compliant operation traces and inference rules for reasoning about
the privacy and data protection properties. The policy specification concept in [1] is based on our
previous work [2], but with modified and extended syntax and semantics elements, specifically for
modelling personal data protection properties. Similarly, the architecture language is a modified
and extended version of the architecture language outlined in [3, 4] with different syntax and
semantics elements.
DataProVe follows the policy and architecture specification concept proposed in [1], but with
some simplification on the original syntax to make it more user and text editor friendly. It is
written in Python and supports graphical user interface (GUI). A user can specify a high-level
data protection (or privacy) policy and a system architecture, then verify different conformance
properties between the specified architecture and the high-level policy in a fully automated way.
With this tool, for instance, one can compare different system architectures based on the same
policy.
The main goals of the tool include helping a system designer at the higher level specification
(compared to the other tools that mainly focus on the protocol level), such as with the policy
and architecture design. This design step can be useful to spot any potential errors before going
ahead with the concrete lower level system specification. In addition, the tool could be useful for
education purposes, as it can be used to explain properties about data protections and system
design.
The verification engine of DataProVe is based on logic, combining both the so-called backward
and forward search strategies of resolution based proofs.
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In DataProVe, a user can specify a “fine-grained" data protection policy through seven sub-
policies, namely, the data collection, data usage, data storage, data retention, data transfer, data
possession and data connection sub-policies1.
In addition, DataProVe supports three types of conformance properties: (i) privacy confor-
mance, (ii) conformance with regards to the data protection regulation (which we refer to as DPR
conformance in this paper), and (iii) functional conformance.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Sections 2-3 we outline the syntax of the policy
and architecture language, respectively, on which DataProVe relies. The automated conformance
verification approach used by DataProVe is detailed in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the tool
itself and its features. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the operation of the tool using some simple
examples.
2 The Specification of a Data Protection Policy
The high-level data protection policy is defined from the perspective of the data controller. Here,
we assume that the data controllers are service providers who collect, store, use or transfer the
personal data about the data subjects. The data subjects in our case are system users whose
personal data is/will be collected and used by the data controller.
A policy is composed of seven sub-policies defined on the data collection, usage, storage,
retention, and transfer procedure, as well as the data possession and data connection sub-policies.
The syntax presented here is a simplified version of the policy language proposed in [1].
2.1 Policy Syntax
A policy of a service provider SP, is defined on a finite set of entities EntitySetSPpol = {e1,. . . , en},
and a finite set of supported data types DataTypesSPpol = {θ1,. . . , θm}. In the following, we provide
a definition for a set of data protection policies.
Definition 1 (Data Protection Policy). The syntax of the data protection policies are defined as
the composition of seven sub-policies, namely:
POL = PolCol × PolUse × PolStr × PolDel × PolFw × PolHas × PolLink.
where
1. PolCol = Conscol × CPurp. (Data Collection Sub-policy)
2. PolUse = Consuse × UPurp. (Data Usage Sub-policy)
3. PolStr = Consstr × Wherestr. (Data Storage Sub-policy)
4. PolDel = Wheredel × Retdelay. (Data Retention Sub-policy)
5. PolFw = Consfw × List3rd. (Data Transfer Sub-policy)
6. PolHas = Whocanhave. (Data Possession Sub-policy)
7. PolLink = Whocanlink. (Data Connection Sub-policy)
1For convenience purpose, the user does not need to specify all the seven sub-policies in one run (which may
take a long time). For convenience purposes, DataProVe is able to check the conformance of an architecture against
a “partially complete" policy, and also supports a save functionality.
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The data collection sub-policy includes whether a collection consent is required (Conscol) and
a set collection purposes (CPurp). The data usage sub-policy specifies whether a usage consent is
required (Consuse) for data usage, and the purposes of the data usage (UPurp). The data storage
sub-policy specifies whether a storage consent is required (Consstr) for storing a piece of data,
and where the data can be stored (Wherestr). The data deletion sub-policy specifies from where
the data can be deleted (Wheredel), alongside the corresponding retention period (Retdel). The
data transfer sub-policy involves whether a transfer consent is required (Consfw), and all the third
party entities to which the data can be transferred (List3rd).
A policy is defined on a data type (θ), specifically, let piθ, piθ ∈ POL, be a policy defined on a
data type θ, and the seven sub-policies picol ∈ PolCol, piuse ∈ PolUse, pistr ∈ PolStr, pidel ∈ PolDel,
pifw ∈ PolFw, pihas ∈ PolHas, pilink ∈ PolLink, where
piθ = (picol, piuse, pistr, pidel, pifw, pihas, pilink),
and each sub-policy of piθ is defined as follows:
1. picol = (cons, cpurp), with cons ∈ {Y , N}. This specifies that if a consent is required to
be collected from the data subjects (Y for Yes) or not (N for No) for this type of data, and
cpurp is a set of collection purposes. Purposes can be text strings that uniquely define the
purpose.
2. piuse = (cons, upurp), with a consent collection requirement, cons ∈ {Y , N}, and upurp, a
set of usage purposes.
3. pistr = (cons, wh), where wh is a set of places where a piece of data can be stored, for instance,
in a device of a customer (e.g. denoted by custloc), with a third party cloud service provider
(thirdpartycloud), or in the service provider’s main or backup storage places (denoted by
mainstorage, backupstorage).
4. pidel = (fromwhere, deld), with
• fromwhere defines the locations from where a piece of data can be deleted. This is
closely related to the storage locations defined in the storage policy (point 3).
• deld represents the delay for the deletion. The value of this delay can be either tNS ,
which refers to a “Non Specific time”, or a specific “numerical" time value (e.g., 1 day,
10 minutes, 5 years, etc.).
5. pifw = (cons, 3rdparty), where cons captures if consent is required or not, and 3rdparty is a
set of third party entities (e.g. authorities, companies, organisations) to whom the data can
be transferred.
6. pihas = whocanhave, where whocanhave is a set of entities in the system that are allowed to
be able to have or possess a piece of data of type θ. We we forbid for a given entity to be
able to have a given data type, then that entity should never be able to have it (e.g. by
obtaining, calculation, interception).
7. pilink = whocanlink, where whocanlink = {(e1,θ1),. . . ,(ek,θk)}, is a set of pairs of entities and
data types defined in the system. Each pair (ei,θi) specifies that ei is allowed to be able to
link two pieces of data of types θ and θi. For instance, whether a service provider is allowed
to be able to link a disease with a work place.
Finally, let us assume a finite set {θ1, . . . , θm} of all data types supported by the service of a
given provider SP .
The semantics of the policy is defined based on events. For more details about the semantics,
we refer the reader to the policy language proposed in [1].
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Then, the data protection (DPR) policy for SP is defined by the set
PL = {piθ1 , . . . , piθm}.
3 The Corresponding Architecture Level
Below, we provide the definition of system architectures, and outline the syntax elements. Again,
the syntax we present here is a simplified version of the architecture language proposed in [1].
While a high-level policy abstracts away from the relationship of the system components/entities
and the messages exchange among them, a system architecture focus on these aspects. System
architectures describe how a system is composed of components and how these components com-
municate with each other, however, they abstract away from the specific implementation details,
such as the specific cryptographic algorithms, the specific order and concrete timing of the mes-
sages.
3.1 Architectures Syntax
In line with the policy specification, a system architecture is defined on a set of components/entities
and data types. We assume that an architecture for a service provider SP is composed of a finite
set of components/entities, EntitySetSParch = {Ei1 , . . . , Eim}. Let DataTypesSParch = {θ1,. . . ,θm} be
the set of all the supported types in an architecture. We assume a finite set of variables Var, X˜
∈ Var, and values Val, D ∈ Val.
HasAcessTo:
HasAcessTo: Ee ∈ EntitySetSParch → {Ee ∈ EntitySetSParch}
Terms:
T ::= Xθ | Vθ | Vpurp | Func
Ti ::= dd | TT
Func ::= F (Xθ1 , . . . , Xθn) | Time( Ti) | Cconsent(Xθ) |
Uconsent(Xθ) | Sconsent(Xθ) | Fwconsent(Xθ, Etowhom)
Destructor application:
G(T1, . . . , Tn) → T
Type:
TYPE(T ) ::= θ, where θ ∈ DataTypesSParch.
Figure 1: Terms, Destructors and Types.
HasAccessTo: HasAccessTo is a function that expects an entity as input and returns a set of
other entities defined in the same architecture. It specifies which entity can have access to the data
handled/stores/collected by which other entities. For example, if Em and Ep represent a smart
meter, and a digital panel (tablet), respectively, and we want to specify that the service provider,
Esp, can have access to the panel and the meter, then, we define the relation HasAccessTo(Esp)
= {Em, Ep}.
Terms: Terms model any data defined in the architecture, and is defined as shown in Figure 1.
4
A term can be a variable (Xθ) that represents some data of type θ, and it can also be a data
constant (Vθ) of a type θ.
For each entity E, we define a finite set of variables (i.e., data) Var = {X˜ | TYPE(X˜) = θ, θ ∈
TYPESPPA} of type θ that it owns or inputs into the system. A variable Xθ ∈ Var represents any
kind of data of type θ supported by a service provider, such as the users’ personal information,
photos, videos, posts, energy consumption data, insurance number, etc. Similarly, a data type can
be anything, such as basic personal information, energy consumption data, etc. F (Xθ1 , . . . , Xθn) is
a function on some pieces of data that can be, for instance, (symmetric, asymmetric, homomorphic)
encryption, crytographic hash and MAC functions.
The special function Time(Ti) specifies the time with either a non-specific time value TT or
a numerical delay value, dd. Cconsent(Xθ), Uconsent(Xθ) and Sconsent(Xθ) specify a piece of
data of type collection, usage, storage consent, respectively, on a piece of data of type θ. Finally,
Fwconsent(Xθ, Etowhom) specifies a type of data transfer consent of a piece of data of type θ,
alongside an entity to whom the data can be forwarded.
A variable Xθ will be given specific data value Vθ during an instance of system run. The
special constants are defined to captures values of special types, such as a purpose value (Vpurp),
a deletion delay value (dd), or the so-called non specific time value (TT ). While dd captures a
numerical time value such as 3 years, 2 months, etc, the value TT is not numerical, and is used
to express the informal term “sometime" or “at some point".
Destructors: A destructor represents an evaluation of a function, used to model a verification
procedure. For instance, if the function F is an encryption or a digital signature, then the cor-
responding destructor G is the decryption or signature verification procedure. More precisely, if
Xenc = Enc(Xname, XSkey) that represents the encryption of data X with the server key XSkey,
and XSkey represents a symmetric key, then G(Xenc, X˜Skey) → X is Dec(Enc(Xname, XSkey),
XSkey)→ Xname. Note that not all functions have a corresponding destructor, e.g., in case Xhash
is a one-way cryptographic hash function, Xhash = Hash(Xpassword), then due to the one-way
property there is no destructor (reverse procedure) that returns Xpassword from the hash Xhash.
The corresponding entity and data type specifications of DataProVe can be found in Sec-
tions 5.1.2 and 5.3, respectively.
The definition of a system architecture: An architecture PA is defined as a set of actions
(denoted by {F}). The formal definition of privacy architectures is given as follows:
PA ::= {F}
F ::= OWNE(Xθ)
| CALCULATEE(Xθ = BT )
| CALCULATEATE(Xθ = BT , Time(TT ))
| CREATEE(Xθ = BT )
| CREATEATE(Xθ = BT , Time(TT ))
| RECEIVEE(Xθ)
| RECEIVEATE(Cconsent(Xθ), Time(TT ))
| RECEIVEATE(Uconsent(Xθ), Time(TT ))
| RECEIVEATE(Sconsent(Xθ), Time(TT ))
| RECEIVEATE(Fwconsent(Xθ,Etowhom), Time(TT ))
| STOREPlaces(Xθ)
| STOREATPlaces(Xθ, Time(TT ))
| DELETEPlaces(Xθ)
| DELETEWITHINPlaces(Xθ, Time(dd)).
Figure 2: The table shows the syntax of a system architecture consisting of allowed actions between
components/entities. The indices E, E1, E2 refer to the entities.
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• Action OWNE(Xθ) captures that E can own the data variable X of type θ.
• CALCULATEE(Xθ = BT ) captures that an entity E can calculate the variable Xθ based
on the equation Xθ = BT .
• Similarly, CREATEE(Xθ = BT ) specifies that E can create a piece of data of type Xθ,
which is equal to BT.
• RECEIVEE(Xθ) specifies that E can receive Xθ.
• The action STOREPlaces(Xθ) says that a piece of data of type θ can store Xθ in the set of
places Places, where Places is a set of entities E ∈ {EMain, EBackUp}. EMain represents a
collection of main storage places such as main servers, while EBackUp represents a collection
of back up storage places (back up servers).
• DELETEPlaces(Xθ) captures that Xθ can be deleted from the places in the set Places.
• CALCULATEATE(Xθ = BT ,Time(TT )) captures that an entity E can calculate the vari-
able Xθ at some non-specific time TT.
• Similarly, CREATEATE(Xθ = BT , Time(TT )) specifies that E can create a piece of data
of type Xθ, which is equal to BT.
• RECEIVEATE(Cconsent(Xθ), Time(TT )) says that a collection consent on Xθ can be
received at some non-specific time TT. The case of Uconsent and Sconsent are similar.
• RECEIVEATE(Fwconsent(Xθ, Etowhom), Time(TT )) says that a transfer consent on Xθ
and Etowhom can be received at some non-specific time TT.
• The action STOREATPlaces(Xθ, Time(TT )) says that Xθ can be deleted at some non-
specific time TT.
• DELETEWITHINPlaces(Xθ, Time(dd)) captures that Xθ must be deleted from the places
in the set Places within a certain time delay dd (recall that dd is a numerical time value).
The specification of the corresponding action in DataProVe can be found in Section 5.1.1. The
semantics of the architectural elements is defined based on states and compliant trace. For more
details, again, we refer the reader to the architecture language proposed in [1].
3.2 The Conformance Between Policies and Architectures
We distinguish three types of conformance: (i) privacy conformance, (ii) conformance with regards
to the data protection regulation (which we refer to as DPR conformance in this paper), and (iii)
functional conformance.
Privacy conformance compares a policy and an architecture based on the privacy properties,
namely, if at the policy level (based on a defined policy) an entity is not allowed have or posses
a given piece of data, then this is also true in the corresponding architecture, and vice versa. It
also says that if at the policy level an entity is not allowed to be able to link two pieces of data of
two different types, then this is also the case in the architecture.
The DPR conformance deals with data protection requirements, such as appropriate consent
collection, satisfaction of the defined deletion/retention delay, appropriate storage and transfer of
a piece of data of given type.
Finally, the functional conformance compares a policy and an architecture based on what
certain entities can have or link which two data types. Namely, which entities at the policy level
and their corresponding entities at the architecture level are allowed to have/posses the same data
type, as well as be able to link two pieces of data of different types. Essentially, in this case we aim
at comparing them from the operational perspectives, as in real life, sometimes we would require
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a system to be able to provide certain services. This conformance can help a system designer to
find an appropriate trade-off between functionality and privacy.
A more formal and detailed discussion of the different forms of conformance can be found in
Section 5.3.
4 The automated verification engine
The verification engine of DataProVe is based on logic and resolution based proofs. Below, we
define the inference rules that will be used in the inference algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Definition 2 An inference rule R is denoted by R = H ` T1, . . . , Tn, where H is the head of
the rule and T1, . . . , Tn is the tail of the rule. Each element Ti of the tail is a fact.
D1. FWCONSENTCOLLECTED(E1,Y1,Third) `
RECEIVEAT(E1,Fwconsent(Y1,Third),Time(T)), RECEIVEAT(Third,Y1,Time(T))
D2. CCONSENTCOLLECTED(QQ,S) `
RECEIVEAT(QQ,Cconsent(S),Time(TM)), RECEIVEAT(QQ,S,Time(TM))
D3. UCONSENTCOLLECTED(LL,UU) `
RECEIVEAT(LL,Uconsent(UU),Time(TI)), CREATEAT(LL,UU,Time(TI))
D4. UCONSENTCOLLECTED(LA,UA) `
RECEIVEAT(LA,Uconsent(UA),Time(TA)), CALCULATEAT(LA,UA,Time(TA))
D5. STRCONSENTCOLLECTED(LS,US) `
RECEIVEAT(LS,Sconsent(US),time(TS)), STOREAT(LS,US,time(TS))
Figure 3: Inference rules for DPR conformance check.
Figure 3 includes the rules used in the verification of the DPR conformance properties. For
instance, rule D1 says that if an entity E1 can receive a consent for the transfer of a piece of data
of type Y1 to an entity Third at some non-specific time T , and Third can receive this data at the
same time (or earlier), then E1 can collect the tranfer consent of Y1 to Third.
The arguments in the inference rules are the entity and data type variables, which can be bound
to constants (a specific entitty and a data type) during the resolution based proofs/unifications.
Figure 4 includes the rules used in the verification of the privacy conformance property (re-
garding the HAS, i.e. data possession, property). For instance, rule P1 says that if the entity RR
can store a piece of data of type NN, and can delete this data within time TT, then the entity can
have this data up to TT time. Rule P3 says that if a trusted authority/organisation has any data
that contains of pseudonymised version of DS, with some other data, then the trusted authority
can also have the same data that contains the “real" DS. Finally, Rule P7 says that if an entity
X can receive a piece of data of type D, then it can have this data.
Figure 5 includes the rules used in the verification of the privacy conformance property (re-
garding the linkability, i.e. data connection, property). For instance, rule L1 says that if the
entity O can have any data that contains two pieces of data of types B, and U alongside with any
other data (denoted by M1@ and M2@), and any data that contains two pieces of data of types J
and U , then O is be able to link B and J . Note that this is not an “unique" link, meaning that
O cannot be sure that B and J belong to the same individual.
Similar to Figure 5, Figure 6 includes the rules used in the verification of the privacy confor-
mance property (but this time, regarding the unique linkability property). For instance, rule U1
says that if an entity O can have any data that contains two pieces of data of types B, and U
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P1. HASUPTO(RR,NN,Time(TT)) `
STORE(RR,NN), DELETEWITHIN(RR,NN,Time(TT))
P2. HASUPTO(RL,NL,Time(TL)) `
STOREAT(RL,NL,Time(AT)), DELETEWITHIN(RL,NL,Time(TL))
P3. HAS(trusted,Anydata(DS,M@)) ` HAS(trusted,Anydata(M@,P(DS)))
P4. HAS(trusted,Anydata(DS,M@)) ` HAS(trusted,Anydata(P(DS),M@))
P5. HAS(trusted,Anydata(M@,DS)) ` HAS(trusted,Anydata(M@,P(DS)))
P6. HAS(trusted,Anydata(M@,DS)) ` HAS(trusted,Anydata(P(DS),M@))
P7. HAS(X,D) ` RECEIVE(X,D)
P8. HAS(XD,DD) ` RECEIVEAT(XD,DD,Time(TD))
P9. HAS(Y,A) ` STORE(Y,A)
P10. HAS(YA,AA) ` STOREAT(YA,AA,Time(TY))
P11. HAS(T,F) ` OWN(T,F)
P12. HAS(Z,E) ` CREATE(Z,E)
P13. HAS(ZE,EE) ` CREATEAT(ZE,EE,Time(TE))
P14. HAS(ZC,EC) ` CALCULATE(ZC,EC)
P15. HAS(ZZ,EZ) ` CALCULATEAT(ZZ,EZ,time(TZ))
P16. HAS(Z,E) ` COLLECT(Z,E)
P17. HAS(L,G) ` HAS(L,Senc(G,I)),HAS(L,I)
P18. HAS(VV,WW) ` HAS(VV,Mac(WW,LW)), HAS(VV,LW)
P19. HAS(PV,QV) ` HAS(PV,Aenc(QV,TV)), HAS(PV,Sk(TV))
Figure 4: Inference rules for privacy conformance check (HAS property). The last three rules cap-
ture cryptographic operations (symmetric encryption, MAC function, and asymmetric encryption,
respectively). These three are the so-called destructor application defined in Figure 1.
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L1. LINK(O,B,J) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(J,M2@,U))
L2. LINK(O,B,J) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(U,M2@,J))
L3. LINK(O,J,B) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(J,M2@,U))
L4. LINK(O,J,B) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(U,M2@,J))
Figure 5: Inference rules for privacy conformance check (Linkability).
U1. LINKUNIQUE(O,B,J) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(J,M2@,U)), UNIQUE(U)
U2. LINKUNIQUE(O,B,J) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(U,M2@,J)), UNIQUE(U)
U3. LINKUNIQUE(O,J,B) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(J,M2@,U)), UNIQUE(U)
U4. LINKUNIQUE(O,J,B) `
HAS(O,_Anydata1(B,M1@,U)), HAS(O,_Anydata2(U,M2@,J)), UNIQUE(U)
Figure 6: Inference rules for privacy conformance check (Unique linkability).
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alongside with M@ (that represents any other data), and any data that contains two pieces of
data of types J and U , and the data U is unique, then O is be able to link B and J . Moreover,
O can be sure that they belong to the same individual.
Note: For simplicity, there are inference rules that can be userd to deduce trivial HAS, LINK,
LINKUNIQUE properties that we use in our tool, but are not included in the Figures 3-6.
Let us define the following rule sets that we will use in the inference algorithms, namely:
• DPRRules = {D1,. . . , D5}.
• HasUpToRules = {P1, P2}.
• HasRules = {P3, . . . , P19}.
• LinkRules = {L1, . . . , L4}.
• LinkUniqueRules = {U1, . . . , U4}.
To speed up the verification process, we also divide the actions defined in an architure to
four subsets, specifically, ArchTime, ArchPseudo, ArchMeta, and Arch. ArchTime includes the
actions that contains the Time() construct, ArchPseudo includes the actions that contains the
P() construct for pseudonymised data, ArchPseudo includes the actions that contains the Meta()
construct for metadata, and finally, Arch is a set of actions without any specific construct above.
4.1 Automated conformance check
The automated conformance verification is based on the execution of resolution steps and backward
search (this is also combined with a forward search strategy when verifying trivial properties, such
as one can link all the data in a message it can receive, to speed up the process). Resolution is well-
known in logic programming and is widely supported in logic programming languages. Intuitively,
a resolution step can be seen as a deduction made based on a fact in one logic rule and a goal in
another rule. Specifically, we input two logic rules and get either a new rule or a fact as a result.
The formal definition of resolution is based on the so-called substitution and unification steps.
A substitution binds some value (aka. pattern) to some variable, and we denote it by σ in this
paper.
Definition 3 A substitution σ is the most general unifier of a set of facts F if it unifies F,and for
any unifier µ of F, there is a unifier µ such that µ = Fσ.
Note that two facts may have several unifiers but only one most general unifier.
Definition 4 Given two rules R1 = H1 ` T1, and R2 = H2 ` T2, T3 , where T2 is unifiable with
H1 with the most general unifier σ, then the resolution R1 ◦(H1,T2) R2 results in a new rule H2σ
` T1σ ∧ T3σ (after the unification of H1 and T2).
The search process is based on a sequence of resolution steps, each of the form R◦T T , between
a rule R and a fact T , where R = H ` T1, . . . , Tn, and T is unifiable with the head H with σ. As
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the result of R ◦(H,T ) T , H and T are eliminated and we receive T1σ, . . . , Tnσ.
Algorithm 1: ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N)
Result: Conformance (1) /Violation of conformance (0)
Inputs:
Rulesets = {DPRRules, HasUpToRules, HasRules, LinkRules, LinkUniqueRules}
Architecture = {ArchTime, ArchPseudo, ArchMeta, Arch}.
Goal: initlgoal.
Allowed layers of nested crypto functions: N ;
if the predicate of initgoal matches the predicate of a head of a rule in RS, RS ∈ Rulesets
then
for rule in RS do
isSuccessful[(rule, initgoal)] = Verify(rule, initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N )
end
if for all rule in RS: isSuccessful[(rule, initgoal)] == 0 then
return 0
else
return 1
end
end
In a policy, each definition of a sub-policy will generate a goal (denoted by initgoal). initgoal
can be a so-called HAS goal, e.g., HAS(sp,name) if we allow for the service provider to be able to
have a data type name. In addition, initgoal can be a LINK or LINKUNIQUE goal, or one of the a
FWCONSENTCOLLECTED, CCONSENTCOLLECTED, UCONSENTCOLLECTED, or STR-
CONSENTCOLLECTED goals, depending on which sub-policy definition it has been generated
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from.
Algorithm 2: Verify(rule, goal, Architecture, Rulesets, N )
GoalsToBeProved = {goal};
if the predicate of goal matches the predicate of an action in AS, AS ∈ Architecture then
for arch in AS do
if arch ◦(arch,goal) goal is successful then
The_Derivation_Was_Successful[(rule,goal,arch)] = 1
else
The_Derivation_Was_Successful[(rule,goal,arch)] = 0
end
if for all arch in AS: The_Derivation_Was_Successful[(rule,goal,arch)] == 0 then
return 0
else
return 1
end
end
else
if the predicate of goal matches the predicate of a rule head in RS, RS ∈ Rulesets then
for nextrule in RS do
if nextrule ◦(head of nextrule,goal) goal is successful then
if ∃ goal in nextrule ◦(head of nextrule,goal) goal that contains more than N
nested layers of crypto functions then
skip to the following rule in RS ;
else
remove goal from GoalsToBeProved ;
add the facts in nextrule ◦(head of nextrule,goal) goal to GoalsToBeProved;
for nextgoal in GoalsToBeProved do
if Verify(nextrule, nextgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 1 then
return 1
else
return 0
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1 defines the process of checking whether the input architecture Architecture is
fulfilling the “initial" goal, initgoal, based on the pre-defined inference rule set Rulesets and a
pre-defined natural N that specifies a limit on nested layers of cryptographic functions used in
a message. ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N ) returns either 1 for a con-
formance, and 0 for a non-conformance (violation). Algorithm 2 defines a recursive verification
procedure of the initial goal through the sub-goals resulted from each resolution step.
We have the following three properties for the conformance verification procedure:
Property 1 (Correctness)
We distinguish several cases based on the nature of initgoal:
1. If initgoal is a HAS goal, and corresponds to the option "Y" in a data possession sub-policy,
then whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 1, the archi-
tecture (defined by Architecture in Algorithm 1) functionally conforms with this requirement
of the policy.
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2. If initgoal is a HAS goal, and corresponds to the option "N" or left blank in a data possession
sub-policy, then whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 1,
the architecture violates the privacy conformance with the policy.
3. If initgoal is a LINK or LINKUNIQUE goal, and corresponds to a link permit sub-policy, then
whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 1, the architecture
functionally conforms with this link policy.
4. If initgoal is a LINK or LINKUNIQUE goal, and corresponds to a link forbid sub-policy, then
whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 1, the architecture
violates the privacy conformance with the policy.
5. If initgoal is a FWCONSENTCOLLECTED, CCONSENTCOLLECTED, UCONSENTCOL-
LECTED, or STRCONSENTCOLLECTED goal, and corresponds to the option "Y" in the
forward, collection, usage, and storage sub-policy, respectively, then the architecture DPR
conforms with the actual sub-policy whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture,
Rulesets, N) == 1.
Property 2 (Termination up-to N)
Let N be the maximum number of nested layers of cryptographic functions the verification engine
will examine. Beside a finite N , the verification procedure never gets into an infinite loop.
The completeness property can be stated as a consequence of the termination property (Prop-
erty 2), as follows:
Property 3 (Completeness)
The following points are valid if all the data types specified in Architecture (see Algorithm 1)
contain at most N layers of nested cryptographic functions, for some finite N :
1. If initgoal is a HAS goal, and corresponds to the option "Y" in a data possession sub-policy,
then whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 0, the archi-
tecture does not functionally conform with the policy.
2. If initgoal is a HAS goal, and corresponds to the option "N" or left blank in a data possession
sub-policy, then whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 0,
the architecture functionally conforms with the policy.
3. If initgoal is a LINK or LINKUNIQUE goal, and corresponds to a link permit sub-policy, then
whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 0, the architecture
does not functionally conform with the policy.
4. If initgoal is a LINK or LINKUNIQUE goal, and corresponds to a link forbid sub-policy, then
whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rulesets, N) == 0, the architecture
functionally conforms with the policy.
5. If initgoal is a FWCONSENTCOLLECTED, CCONSENTCOLLECTED, UCONSENTCOL-
LECTED, or STRCONSENTCOLLECTED goal, and corresponds to the option "Y" in the
forward, collection, usage, and storage sub-policy, respectively, then the architecture does not
DPR conform with the policy whenever ConformanceCheck(initgoal, Architecture, Rule-
sets, N) == 0.
Property 3 says that completeness can only be “achieved" up to the maximum allowed nested
layers of cryptographic functions, N .
5 Implementation
DataProVe is written in Python, and is available for download from GitHub2.
2https://github.com/vinhgithub83/DataProVe
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5.1 The System Architecture Specification Page
After launching the tool, as depicted in Figure 7, the default page can be seen, where the user
can specify a system architecture. DataProVe supports two types of components, the so-called
main components, and the sub-components. The main components can represent an entire organ-
isation, system or entities that consists of several smaller components, such as a service provider,
a customer, or authority (trusted third-party organisation). Sub-components are elements of a
main component, for example, a service provider can have a server, a panel, or storage place. A
main component usually has access to the data handled by its own sub-components, but this is
not always the case, for instance, two main components can share a sub-component and only one
main-component has access to its data. This can happen, for example, when a service provider
operates a device of a trusted third party, but it does not have free access to the content of the
data stored inside the device.
Figure 7: After launching DataProVe, the system architecture specification page can be seen.
In the first version of DataProVe (v0.9), main components are represented by rectangular
shapes, while sub-components are represented by circles. Examples can be seen in Figures 8-11.
In this report, we will interchange between the two terms entity and component, because the
term entity has been used in our theoretical papers, while the tool uses the term component more.
They refer to the same thing in our context.
In DataProVe one can specify which main-component can have access to which sub-component.
An example can be seen in Figure 12, where we specified the relation between sp and server, meter,
as well as between the authority auth and meter, socialmediapage.
In Figure 13, a new text box is created with the name recvdmsg1, which denotes that the
server receives a message called msg1. Its content (depicted in Figure 14) says that sp can receive
a reading that contains the energy consumption (energy) and the customer ID (custID).
In the architecture level, we distinguish entity/component, actions and data, where actions
specify what an entity/component can do on a piece of data (it may not perform this action
eventually during a low-level system run, but there are instances of the system run that where
this action happens), except for DELETEWITHIN, as we will see later.
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Figure 8: Adding a main component of size 170x130.
Figure 9: Adding a new main component of size 200x50.
5.1.1 ACTIONS
Based on the definition of actions and architectures in Figure 2, we propose their corresponding
formats that can be given in the text boxes/text editor in DataProVe.
Actions are words/string of all capital letters, and DataProVe supports the actions "OWN",
"RECEIVE", "RECEIVEAT", "CREATE", "CREATEAT", "CALCULATE", "CALCULATEAT",
"STORE", "STOREAT", "DELETE", "DELETEWITHIN". The syntax of each action in Dat-
aProVe is as follows.
Note: no space character is allowed when specifying the actions in the bullet points below.
The reserved/pre-defined keywords are highlighted in bold, while the non-bold text can be
freely defined by the user:
• OWN(component,Datatype) :
This action defines that a component (e.g., sp, auth, server, meter etc.) can own a piece
of data of type Datatype. For example, OWN(server,spkey) say they server can own the a
piece of data of type service provider key (spkey).
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Figure 10: Adding a new sub-component with a radius size of 20.
Figure 11: Choosing the color for a component.
• RECEIVE(component,Datatype):
This action defines that a component can receive a piece of data of type Datatype, for
example, RECEIVE(server,Sicknessrecord(name,insurancenumber)) says that server can
receive a sickness record that contains a piece of data of type name and insurance number.
• RECEIVEAT(component,Datatype,Time(t)):
This action is similar to the previous one, except that here we also need to define the time
when the data can be received. Since at the architecture level we do not intent to spec-
ify the concrete time value, the generic time construct, denoted by the keyword Time(t)
specifies that component can receive a piece of data of type Datatype at some (not specific)
time t. RECEVEAT is used to define when a consent (Cconsent(Datatype), Ucon-
sent(Datatype), Sconsent(Datatype), Fwconsent(Datatype)) is received.
• CREATE(component,Datatype):
This action defines that a component can create a piece of data of type Datatype, for instance,
CREATE(sp,Account(name,address,phone)) defines that a service provider sp can create
an account that contains three pieces of data of types name, address and phone number.
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Figure 12: Specify which main component has access to the data in which sub component (sp has
access to server and meter, while auth has access to meter and socialmediapage).
Figure 13: Draw an arrow from the component meter to server.
• CREATEAT(component,Datatype,Time(t)):
This action defines that a component can create a piece of data of type Datatype at some
(not specific) time t. For example, CREATE(sp,Account(name,address,phone),Time(t)).
• CALCULATE(component,Datatype):
This action defines that a component can calculate a piece of data of type Datatype, for
instance, CALCULATE(sp,Bill(energyconsumption)) defines that a service provider sp
can calculate a bill using a piece of data of type energy consumption.
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Figure 14: Specify the message content of recvdmsg1 (through the action RECEIVE).
• CALCULATEAT(component,Datatype,Time(t)):
This action defines that a component can calculate a piece of data of type Datatype at some
(not specific) time t. For example, CALCULATE(sp,Bill(energyconsumption),Time(t)).
• STORE(storageplace,Datatype):
This action defines that a service provider can store a piece of data of type Datatype in stor-
ageplace, where storageplace can be mainstorage, backupstorage. These reserved key-
words define a collection of storage place(s) that can be seen as “main" storage, or “backup"
storage, respectively.
For example, STORE(mainstorage,Account(name,address,phone)) defines that a service
provider can store an account that contains name, address and phone number in its main
storage place(s).
• STOREAT(storageplace,Datatype,Time(t)):
This action defines that a component can store a piece of data of type Datatype in the
place(s) storageplace at some (not specific) time t.
For example, STORE(mainstorage,Account(name,address,phone),Time(t)) defines that
an account with a name, address and phone number can be stored in the main storage of
the service provider at some time t.
• DELETE(storageplace,Datatype):
The action delete is closely related to the action store, as it defines that a piece of data of
type Datatype can be deleted from storageplace.
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For example, DELETE(mainstorage,Account(name,address,phone)) captures that a ser-
vice provider can.
• DELETEWITHIN(storageplace,Datatype,Time(tvalue)):
This action captures that once the data is stored, a component must delete a piece of data
of type Datatype within the given time value tvalue (tvalue is a data type for time values).
Unlike the non-specific Time(t), which is a predefined construct, tvalue is defined by the
user, and takes specific time values such as 3 years or 2 years 6 months.
For example,DELETE(mainstorage,Account(name,address,phone),Time(2y)) defines that
the service provider must delete an account from its main storage within 2 years.
5.1.2 COMPONENTS/ENTITY
A component can be specified by a string of all lower case, for example, a service provider can
be specified by sp, or a third-party authority by auth (obviously they can be specified with any
other string).
DataProVe supports some pre-defined or reserved components/entities, such as sp, trusted,
mainstorage, backupstorage.
• sp: this reserved keyword defines a service provider. DataProVe only allows a single service
provider at a time (in the specification of a policy and architecture).
• trusted: this reserved keyword defines a trusted authority that is able to link a pseudonym
to the corresponding real name.
• mainstorage: this reserved keyword defines the collection of main storage places of a service
provider.
• backupstorage: this reserved keyword defines the collection of backup storage places of a
service provider.
Note: An entity/component is always defined as the first argument of an action.
5.1.3 DATA TYPES
DataProVe supports two groups of data types, the so-called compound data types, and simple
data types.
• Simple data types do not have any arguments, and they are specified by strings of all
lower cases, without any space or special character. Example simple data types include
name, address, phonenumber, nhsnumber, etc.
• Compound data types have arguments, and they are specified by strings that start with
a capital letter followed by lower cases (again without any space or special character).
For example, Account(name,address,phone) is a compound data type that contains three
simple data types as arguments. Another example compound data type can be Hospital-
record(name,address,insurance). Any similar compound data types can be defined by the
user. We note that the space character is not allowed in the compound data types.
Nested compound data types are compound data types that contain another compound
data types. For instance, Hospitalrec(Sicknessrec(name,disease),address,insurance) captures
a hospital record that contains a sickness record of a name and disease, and an address, and
finally, an insurance number.
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Note: The first version of DataProve (v0.9) supports three layers of nested data types.
DataProVe has pre-defined or reserved data types, such as
• The types of consents: Cconsent(Datatype), Uconsent(Datatype), Sconsent(Datatype),
Fwconsent(Datatype).
We do not differentiate among the different consent format, it can be e.g. written consent,
or online consent form, or some other formats.
– Cconsent(Datatype): This is a type of collection consent on a piece of data of type
Datatype. For example, Cconsent(illness), Cconsent(Account(creditcard,address))
capture the collection consent on the illness information, and the account containing a
credit card number and address.
– Uconsent(Datatype): A type of usage consent on a piece of data of type Datatype.
For example, Uconsent(Energy(gas,water,electricity)), Uconsent(address).
– Sconsent(Datatype): A type of storage consent on a piece of data of type Datatype.
For example, Sconsent(personalinfo), Sconsent(Account(creditcard,address)) defines
the types of storage consent on a type of personal information and account, respectively.
– Fwconsent(Datatype,component): A type of forward/transfer consent on a piece of
data of type Datatype, and a component to whom the data is forwarded/transfered. E.g.
Fwconsent(personalinfo,auth), Fwconsent(Account(creditcard,address),auth) defines
the type of forward consent on the type of personal information and account, respec-
tively, as well as a third party authority (auth) to which the given data is forwarded.
• The types of time and time value: Time(t) or Time(tvalue), where Time() is a time data
type, while the pre-defined special keyword t denotes a type of non-specific time, and tvalue
is a type of time value (such as 5 years, 2 hours, 1 minute, etc.). tvalue is a (recursive) type
and takes the form of
tvalue ::= y | mo | w | d | h | m | numtvalue | tvalue + tvalue
where y specifies a year, mo a month, w a week, d a day, h an hour and m a minute. Further,
numtvalue is the a number (num) before tvalue, for example if num = 3 and tvalue = y,
then numtvalue is 3y (i.e. 3 years). Additional examples include tvalue = 5y + 2mo + 1d
+ 5m.
It is important to note that Time(tvalue) can only be used in the action DELETE-
WITHIN,RECEIVEAT,CREATEAT,CALCULATEAT, STOREATmust contain
the non-specific time Time(t).
For example, the actions
– DELETEWITHIN(sp,mainstorage,Webpage(photo,job),Time(10y+6mo)) Any web-
page must be deleted from the main storage of the service provider within 10 years and
6 months.
– RECEIVEAT(sp,Cconsent(illness),Time(t)) The service provider can receive a col-
lection consent on illness information at some non-specific time t.
– RECEIVEAT(sp,Uconsent(Webpage(photo,job)),Time(t)) The service provider can
receive a usage consent on a webpage at some non-specific time t.
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– STOREAT(sp,backupstorage,Webpage(photo,job),Time(t)) The service provider
can store a webpage in its back up storage places at some non-specific time t.
– CREATEAT(server,Account(name,address),Time(t)): The service provider can cre-
ate an account that contains a name and address in at some non-specific time t.
– CALCULATEAT(sp,Bill(tariff,Energy(gas,water,electricity)),Time(t)): The service
provider can create an account that contains a name and address in at some non-specific
time t.
• The type of metadata and meta values: Meta(Datatype).
This data type defines the type of metadata (information about other data), or information
located in the header of the packets, the meta information often travels through a network
without any encryption or protection, which may pose privacy concern. Careful policy and
system design are necessary to avoid privacy breach caused by the analysis of metadata or
header information.
Note: Meta(Datatype) is always defined as the last argument in a piece of data.
Example application of metadata includes:
– RECEIVE(sp,Sicknessrec(name,disease,Meta(ip))):
This action defines that the service provider can receive a packet that containing a
name and disease, but the packet also includes the metadata IP address of the sender
computer. We note that this syntax is simplified in terms that it aims to eliminate
the complexity of nested data type. Specifically, this syntax abstracts away from the
definition of the so-called packet data type, an “abbreviation" of the lengthy RE-
CEIVE(sp,Packet(Sicknessrec(name,disease),Meta(ip)))).
– RECEIVE(sp,Sicknessrec(name,disease,Meta(Enc(ip,k)))): This action is similar to
the previous one, but now the metadata IP address is encrypted with a key k.
– RECEIVEAT(sp,Sicknessrec(name,disease,Meta(ip)),Time(t)):
This action is similar to the first one, but it includes the time data types at the end. It
defines that the service provider receives the sickness record along with the IP address
of the sender device, at some non-specific time t.
Obviously, any metadata can be defined instead of IP address in the examples above.
• The type pseudonymous data: P(Datatype | component).
This data type defines the type of pseudonymous data, for example, a pseudonym. The
argument can be either a data type or a component 3. Pseudonym is a means for achieving
a certain degree of privacy in practice as the real identity/name and the pseudonym can only
be linked by a so-called trusted authority. DataProVe also captures this property, namely,
only the component trusted can link the pseudonym to the real name/identity.
For example,
– RECEIVE(sp,Sicknessrec(P(name),disease)):
This action defines that a service provider can receive a sickness record, but this time,
the name in the record is not the real name but a pseudonym, hence, the service provider
cannot link a real name to a disease.
3This would be in the versions above v0.9. In the version 0.9, DataProVe preserves the keyword (all small
letters) ds for data subject, and the user can define P(ds) to specify that the real data subject/identity has been
pseudonymised.
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– RECEIVE(trusted,Sicknessrec(P(name),disease)):
This is similar to previous case, but the trusted authority can receive a sickness record
instead of the service provider.
– RECEIVE(sp,Sicknessrec(P(name),disease,Meta(ip))): Again, this is similar to the
first case, but with metadata.
– RECEIVEAT(sp,Sicknessrec(name,disease,Meta(ip)),Time(t)): This is similar to
previous case, but also include the time data type.
• The types of cryptographic primitives and operations: DataProVe supports the basic cryp-
tographic primitives for the architecture. Again, we provide the reserved keywords in bold.
– Private key: Sk(Pkeytype):
This data type defines the type of private key used in asymmetric encryption algorithms.
Its argument has a type of public key (Pkeytype). We note that public key is not a
reserved data type.
– Symmetric encryption: Senc(Datatype,Keytype):
This is the type of the cipher text resulted from a symmetric encryption, and has two
arguments, a piece of data and a symmetric key (Keytype).
For example,
∗ RECEIVE(sp,Senc(Account(name,address),key)):
This specifies that a service provider can receive a symmetric key encryption of an
account using a key of type key.
∗ RECEIVE(sp,Senc(Account(Senc(name,key),address),key)):
This specifies that a service provider can receive a symmetric key encryption of an
account that contains another encryption of a name, using a key of type key.
∗ OWN(sp,key):
This specifies that a service provider can own a key of type key.
– Asymmetric encryption: Aenc(Datatype,Pkeytype):
This is the type of the cipher text resulted from an asymmetric encryption, and has
two arguments, a piece of data and a public key (Pkeytype).
For example,
∗ RECEIVE(sp,Aenc(Account(name,address),pkey)):
This specifies that a service provider can receive an asymmetric key encryption of
an account using a public key of type pkey.
∗ CALCULATE(sp,Sk(pkey)):
This specifies that a service provider can calculate a private key corresponding to
the public key (of type pkey).
∗ OWN(sp,pkey):
This specifies that a service provider can own a public key of type pkey.
– Message authentication code (MAC): Mac(Datatype,Keytype):
This is the type of the message authentication code that has two arguments, a piece of
data and a symmetric key (Keytype).
For example,
∗ RECEIVE(sp,Mac(Account(name,address),key)):
This specifies that a service provider can receive a message authentication code of
an account using a key of type key.
– Cryptographic hash: Hash(Datatype):
This is the type of the cryptographic hash that has only one argument, a piece of data.
For example,
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∗ RECEIVE(server,Hash(password)):
This specifies that a server can receive a hash of a password.
∗ STORE(sp,mainstorage,Hash(password)):
This specifies that a service provider can store a hash of a password in its main
storage place(s).
5.2 The Data Protection Policy Specification Page
On the data protection policy specification page, we can define a high-level data protection policy
(as shown in Figure 15).
Figure 15: The Policy Specification Page.
5.2.1 Entities/Components (the top part)
The policy page has three parts, the top part is to specify the entities/components in the system,
such as authority, client etc. On the left side, the user is expected to provide a short notation,
and on the right side, the full name/description to help identifying the meaning of the notation.
For instance, in Figure 15, the notation is auth, and the description is third party authority. After
adding a new entity, it will appear in the drop-down option menu in the bottom part. Note that
the entity sp (service provider) is a pre-defined entity that is already added by default
(hence, the user does not need to add). The user can specify any other entities.
5.2.2 Data groups/Data types (the middle part)
The middle part in the policy specification page is for defining the data groups and data types.
As shown in Figure 16, the user can define a group of data types, for instance, a data group
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denoted by personalinfo is defined which includes four data types, name, address, dateofbirth, and
phonenumber.
Figure 16: Specifying data groups (personalinfo) and its data types.
The option menu in the middle (called “IS THIS UNIQUE") expects the user to provide if
the data group together with its data types can be used to uniquely identify an individual. For
instance, a name alone cannot be used to unique identify an individual, but a name together with
an address, date of birth and phone number, can be, so the option “YesâĂİ was chosen. Another
example is shown in Figure 17, with the data group called energy (refers to energy consumption)
and its data types, gas, water, and electricity consumption. This type group together with its
types cannot be used to uniquely identify an individual, hence, the option “NoâĂİ was chosen.
Figure 17: Specifying data groups (energy) and its data types.
5.2.3 Policy specification (the bottom part)
Based on the syntax of the policy language given in Section 2.1, we follow the seven sub-policies.
However, here to avoid confusion we divide the last sub-policy, the data connection policy, into
two categories,the data connection permit and data connection forbid policies. In the first one the
user can specify which data link they allow, while in the second one for which they forbid.
A data protection policy is defined on a data group/type and an entity. In DataProVe, each
policy consists of eight sub-policies, to achieve a fine-grained requirement specification (Figure 18).
The users do not have to define all the eight sub-policies, but they can if it is necessary. Both the
policies and architectures can be saved, and opened later to modify or extend.
The first five sub-policies (collection, transfer) are defined only from the service provider’s
perspective. For the rest three sub-policies (data possession and the two data connections policies),
the user can specify from any entity’s perspective.
The eight sub-policies are data collection, data usage, data storage, data retention, data trans-
fer, data possession and the two data connection sub-policies. Below we only highlight four
sub-policies, for the rest four the readers are referred to full manual in the GitHub repository4.
4https://github.com/vinhgithub83/DataProVe
24
Figure 18: The Policy Specification Page (entities).
Figure 19: The Policy Specification Page (data groups).
Figure 20: The Policy Specification Page (choosing among data types).
The data collection sub-policy: In the data collection sub-policy window, for a given entity
and data group the user can specify whether consent is required to be collection when the selected
entity collect a selected data group (Y for Yes/N for No), and then specify the collection purposes.
The collection purposes can be given row by row, each row with a different action in the format
of:
action1:data1,data2,. . . ,data_n
where action1 can be any action, while data1,. . . , data_n are compound data types (note that
these compound data types do not need to be specified/added in the policy). For example, in
Figure 21, the user sets that consent is required to be collected when the service provider collects
the personal information. Then, the collection purpose for personal information is to create an
account. The compound type account does not need to be defined in the policy.
The data possession sub-policy:
The data possession sub-policy defines who can have/possess a piece of data of a given group.
The users only need to specify who are allowed to have or possess a given data group, DataProVe
automatically assumes that the rest entities/components are not allowed to have/possess the
selected type of data.
The data connection permitted sub-policy: This sub-policy specifies which entity is
permitted to connect or link two types/groups of data.
In the second drop-down option menu, the user can specify further if the selected entity is
permitted to be able to link two pieces of data uniquely, meaning that it will be able to deduce
that the two pieces of data belongs to the same individual.
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Figure 21: The data collection sub-policy.
Figure 22: The data possession sub-policy.
For example, in Figure 23, we specified that the service provider is permitted to be able to
link the data group energy and the data group personalinfo. However, we do not allow the service
provider to be able to uniquely link the two data groups. Obviously, if personalinfo was defined as
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Figure 23: The data connection permission sub-policy.
unique, then unique link would be possible, so there is chance that the architecture always violates
this requirement of the policy.
The data connection forbidden sub-policy: This sub-policy is the counterpart of the
permitted policy. While in case of the data possession policy, the user only needs to specify
which entity is allowed to have or possess certain type of data, and DataProVe automatically
assumes that the rest are not allowed, here the user needs to explicitly specify which pair of data
types/groups are an entity is forbidden to be able to link together.
For example, in Figure 24, we forbid for the third-party authority to be able to link the data
group personalinfo with the data group energy. Here, we forbid the unique link-ability of these
two data groups for the third-party authority.
If we choose âĂĲNoâĂİ (Figure 25), then it means that any ability to link any two pieces of
data of the given data groups, is forbidden (not just unique link). Hence, this option is stricter
than the previously one.
5.3 Conformance verification
We define three types of conformance, namely, functional conformance, privacy conformance and
the so-called DPR conformance.
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Figure 24: The data connection permission sub-policy. The case when only unique link is forbid-
den.
5.3.1 Functional conformance
The functional conformance captures if an architecture is functionally conforming with the speci-
fied policy. Namely:
1. If in the policy, we allow for an entity to be able to have a piece of data of certain data
type/group, then in the architecture the same entity can have a piece of data of the same
type/group.
2. If in the policy, we allow for an entity to be able to link/uniquely link two pieces of data
of certain types/groups, then in the architecture the same entity can link/uniquely link two
pieces of data of the same types/groups.
3. If in the policy, the (collection, usage, storage, transfer) consent collection is not required for
a piece of data of given type/group, then in the architecture there is no consent collection.
4. If in the policy, we define
(a) a storage option âĂĲMain and Backup StorageâĂİ for a piece of data of certain
type/group, then in the architecture there is a STORE or STOREAT action de-
fined for both mainstorage and backupstorage, and for the same data type/group;
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Figure 25: The data connection permission sub-policy.
(b) a storage option âĂĲOnly Main StorageâĂİ, then in the architecture there is a STORE
or STOREAT action defined for onlymainstorage, and for the same data type/group.
(c) If in the policy, we allow a piece of data of certain type/group, data, to be transferred
to an entity ent, then in the architecture there is RECEIVEAT(ent,data,Time(t))
or RECEIVE(ent,data).
5.3.2 Violation of the functional conformance
1. In the policy, we allow for an entity to be able to have a piece of data of certain data
type/group, but in the architecture the same entity cannot have a piece of data of the same
type/group.
2. In the policy, we allow for an entity to be able to link/uniquely link two pieces of data of
certain types/groups, but in the architecture the same entity cannot link/uniquely link two
pieces of data of the same types/groups.
3. In the policy, the (collection, usage, storage, transfer) consent collection is not required for
a piece of data of given type/group, but in the architecture there is a consent collection,
namely, an action
• RECEIVEAT(sp,Cconsent(data),Time(t)), or
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Figure 26: To verify the conformance between the specified system architecture and policy.
• RECEIVEAT(sp,Sconsent(data),Time(t)), or
• RECEIVEAT(sp,Uconsent(data),Time(t)), or
• RECEIVEAT(third,Fwconsent(data,third),Time(t)).
4. In the policy, we define
(a) a storage option âĂĲMain and Backup StorageâĂİ for a piece of data of certain
type/group, but in the architecture, there is STORE or STOREAT action defined
for only either mainstorage or backupstorage, or no store action defined at all, for
the same data type/group;
(b) a storage option âĂĲOnly Main StorageâĂİ, but in the architecture there is no STORE
or STOREAT action defined at all, for the same data type/group.
5. In the policy, we allow a piece of data of certain type/group, data, to be transferred to
an entity ent, but in the architecture there is no RECEIVEAT(ent,data,Time(t)) or
RECEIVE(ent,data) defined (i.e., data is not transferred to the entity ent).
5.3.3 Privacy conformance
The privacy conformance captures if an architecture satisfies the privacy requirements defined in
the policy. Namely:
1. If in the policy, we forbid for an entity to be able to have or possess a piece of data of certain
type/group, then in the architecture the same entity cannot have or possess a piece of data
of the same type/group.
2. If in the policy, we forbid for an entity to be able to link/uniquely link two pieces of data
of certain types/groups, then in the architecture the same entity cannot link/uniquely link
two pieces of data of the same types/groups.
5.3.4 Violation of the privacy conformance
1. In the policy, we forbid for an entity to be able to have or possess a piece of data of certain
type/group, but in the architecture the same entity can/is be able to have or possess a piece
of data of the same type/group.
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2. In the policy, we forbid for an entity to be able to link/uniquely link two pieces of data of
certain types/groups, but in the architecture the same entity can/is be able to link/uniquely
link two pieces of data of the same types/groups.
5.3.5 DPR conformance
The privacy conformance captures if an architecture satisfies the data protection requirements
defined in the policy. Namely:
1. If in the policy, the (collection, usage, storage, transfer) consent collection is required for
a piece of data of given type/group, then in the architecture there is a collection for the
corresponding consent.
2. If in the policy, we define a (collection, usage, storage) purpose action:data for a piece of
data of certain type/group, then in the architecture there is the action action defined on a
compound data type data.
5.3.6 Violation of the DPR conformance
1. In the policy, the (collection, usage, storage, transfer) consent collection is required for a
piece of data of given type/group, but in the architecture, there is no collection for the
corresponding consent.
2. In the policy, we define a (collection, usage, storage) purpose action:data for a piece of data
of certain type/group, but in the architecture there is not any action action defined on a
compound data type data, or besides action, there are also other actions defined in the
architecture on data that are not allowed in the policy.
3. In the policy, we define
(a) a storage option âĂĲMain and Backup StorageâĂİ for a piece of data of certain
type/group, but in the architecture there is a STORE or STOREAT action defined
for some storage place, different from mainstorage and backupstorage, for the same
data type/group;
(b) a storage option âĂĲOnly Main StorageâĂİ, but in the architecture there is a STORE
or STOREAT action defined for some storage place, different from mainstorage, for
the same data type/group.
4. In the policy, we define
(a) a deletion option âĂĲFrom Main and Backup StorageâĂİ for a piece of data of a certain
data type/group, data, but in the architecture there is not any of the action
• DELETE(mainstorage,data) or
• DELETEWITHIN(mainstorage,data,Time(tvalue)), or
• DELETE(backupstorage,data) or
• DELETEWITHIN(backupstorage,data,Time(tvalue));
(b) a deletion option âĂĲOnly From Main StorageâĂİ for a piece of data of a certain data
type/group, data, but in the architecture there is no actionDELETE(mainstorage,data)
or DELETEWITHIN(mainstorage,data,Time(tvalue)).
5. In the policy, we allow a piece of data of certain type/group, data, to be transferred to an
entity ent, but in the architecture there is also an actionRECEIVEAT(ent1,data,Time(t))
or RECEIVE(ent1,data) defined for some ent1 to whom we do not allow data transfer in
the policy.
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6 Application Examples
In this section, we highlight the operation of DataProVe through two very simple examples.
6.1 Example 1 (Data retention policy)
In this example, in the policy we specify a data group called personalinfo, which is stored centrally
at the service provider, only in the main storage places. In the storage sub-policy, we also set that
storage consent is required before the store action takes place. Finally, we do not allow for the
service provider (sp) to be able to have the data of type/group personalinfo.
As for the deletion policy, we set the retention delay in the main storage to 8 years (i.e. 8y, as
shown in Figure 27).
Figure 27: We set that the data of type/group personal information must be deleted from the
main storage places of the service provider within 8 year.
In the architecture level, we add an action that says a piece of data of type personalinfo needs
to be deleted from the main storage within 10 years (action DELETEWITHIN, in the last line).
Content of spmessages: RECEIVEAT(sp,Sconsent(personalinfo),Time(t))
Content of storagemessages: RECEIVEAT(mainstorage,personalinfo,Time(t))
Content of storemain: STOREAT(mainstorage,personalinfo,Time(t))
Content of deletion: DELETEWITHIN(mainstorage,personalinfo,Time(10y)).
In the architecture shown in Figure 28, the service provider (sp) can receive a storage consent
for personalinfo at some non-specific time t. The main storage places of sp can receive the data
at some non-specific time and store it. The data of this type/group is deleted within 10 years
from the main storage places. In the box above, the content of each text box in Figure 28 can
be seen (except for sp and cust, which denote the name of the service provider and customer,
respectively).
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Figure 28: The service provider (sp) stores the personal information in its main storage places.
As a verification result (Figure 29), we got that the architecture violates the privacy con-
formance, as the architecture allows for sp to have the data of type personalinfo after 8 years,
however, in the policy we set it to only 8 years. In the last line of the verification result window,
we can also see a DPR conformance property, namely, sp collects storage consent before the data
is stored. The first two lines are because we did not specify the collection and usage sub-policies
(left blank).
Figure 29: The verification results show the violation of the privacy and DPR conformance prop-
erties.
6.2 Example 2 (Data possession and connection policy)
In the second simple example, we focus on the data possession and data connection sub-policies.
We present the receive action with the Meta construct (metadata or "packet" header data such as
IP address, source, destination addresses, etc.).
In the policy, we define four data groups, nhsnumber (National Health Service number), name,
photo, and address (see Figure 30).
Then, we forbid (any kind of link-ability, not only unique link) for the service provider to be
able to link two pieces of data of types nhsnumber, and photo (see Figure 31). Again, we also
forbid for the service provider to be able to have all the four data types/groups.
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Figure 30: The policy level with the four data types/groups.
Figure 31: The specified data connection sub-policy for example 2.
In the architecture, a service provider collects data from two phone applications (Figure 32).
The "HealthXYZ" app sends the service provider a sickness record with an ip address (phone ip)
other app, called, "SocialXYZ" also sends the social profile with the same ip address (same phone).
Both data types/groups are encrypted (using symmetric encryption) with the service provider keys
(sp owns the two keys).
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Figure 32: The specified architecture for example 2.
Content of spmessage1 in Figure 32:
RECEIVE(sp,Senc(Sicknessrecord(nhsnumber,name,Meta(ip)),spkey1))
Content of spmessage2 in Figure 32:
RECEIVE(sp,Senc(Socprofile(photo,address,Meta(ip)),spkey2))
Content of spowned in Figure 32:
OWN(sp,spkey1)
OWN(sp,spkey2)
As a result (Figure 33), we got that the service provider not only be able to link the data of
types nhsnumber with the data of type photo, but it also has all the data of types nhsnumber,
name, photo and address. The reason is that sp will be able to decrypt both messages and link,
have the data inside them.
Figure 33: The verification result for example 2.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we presented DataProVe, a tool for specifying data protection policies and system
architectures, as well as verifying their conformance properties in a fully automated way. We also
presented the syntax of the policy and architecture languages on which the tool is based. The
main goal of the tool is to aid policy and system designer to reason about their designs, and spot
any error at an early stage. The tool could be useful for education purposes as well, aide the
tutors with explaining about data protections and design. The development of the tool is still at
an early stage and ongoing, with many ways to extend and improve it. For example, to include
an attacker model, and verify conformance properties in a hostile environment with attackers. In
addtion, to add more guidance and hints on how to fix the violation of conformance properties.
Finally, integrate it with security protocol verification tools such as ProVerif or AVISPA is also
an interesting direction, in order to connect all the three levels, namely, the policy level, the
architecture level and the implementation level.
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